Are there many libertarianish theorists who subscribe to freedom-as-non-domination, or variants thereof? Kukathas' (2003) emphasis on freedom of conscience strikes me as not unrelated, insofar as it's a (distinctly individualized) way of requiring institutions be arranged so as to minimize (a certainly conception of) arbitrary power. Others? Am I totally off-base in so characterizing Kukathas?
EDIT: Hayek, obviously, at least sometimes. Silly Trapnel. More?
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
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I think what there are, are libertarianish theorists who doubt that the non-domination/ non-interference distinction is as novel as neo-republicans have made it out to be. Locke complained about arbitrary *and* absolute power (the contrast concepts to non-domination and non-interference). The classic theorists of liberty as non-interference are Hobbes and Bentham-- who are, to put it mildly, not standard cases of liberal rights theory or its libertarian descendant.
Hayek, as you note, goes so far as to characterize liberty almost entirely as non-arbitrariness or the rule of law. I don't think that's the standard libertarian move. But neither have you seen an outpouring of libertarian responses to Pettit that rally to the defense of Hobbes.
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